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COM(S1) 131 final~etent economic ~erformance in the Community
The slow-down in economic activity in 1980, with GOP growing 1,
in the EC as II wt1o.le; was apprOximately as foreseen by the council in
in Decemb~~. ~t,"~as~. year'. Output pea~ec.t i~: the .fit. t quarter of 1980,
but dec lined thgreafter. However.. pri'vate- .
con~umption was probably beginning to grow again in real terms by the end
of the year, while the EC business surveys showed first signs that the sharp
deterioration in business sentiment may have be~n' .9rrested.
There was hardly any increase in employment in 1980, wbi le the labour
force continued to expand rather rapidly. The result was a sharp rise in
unemployment: the average rate for the year was 6,0%, and by the beginning
of 1981 had pass.ed 1,0%. Over the last twelve months the unemployment rate
increased most in Denmark and t~e N.etherlands (up by about one half) and the
United Kingdom (up by twQ-thirds). The additional cost to the national_excn~gy~~
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of the rise in unemployment amounts for the Community as a whole to some 
0, 1:~~~
of GDP for 1980 compared to 1919.
The deterioration in inflation performance which had begun in 1979
was accentuated in 1980; the increase in consumer prices in the Community
o~ average reached 12,1% in 1980, compared to the low point of 7,3% in 1978.
Divergence between consumer price rises of Member States aLso widened to twice tne
average fpr the seventies as a whole (the standard deviation .rose to
6%). However, a somewhat better performance was evident in the second
half of the year, especially in t.he United Kingdom where the annual. rate
had fallen. to below double figures. 
The Commun~ty' s current account deficit in 1980, expressed as a
percentage of GDP, was the largest ever recorded. In contrast with 1979,
there ~as some improvement in 1980 in export in rel.9tion to import voLuma.
However, this was more than offset by a terms of trade deterioration (2,8%)
considerably larger than that in 1919 (although this was still very much
small,r than that suffered in 1974 after the first oil-price shock).
Exchange~rates developments in the EMS in 1980 were l 1m i led to
movements permi tted by unchanged central rates. However, the UK pound apprec iated
15% against the .ECU in the course of the year, and the Yen 24%. The US dollar
was on a declining trend ~gainst the fCU until mid-year, but has since
recovered substantially~'
. . / . .t:: .
Outlook for 1981
The present cycLe is .now seen as being sharper and deeper than
anticipated. The starting point, the high level of activity in early 1980
has been again revised upwards, with the steeper fall later in 1980 then
carrying a heavier recess;onary momentum over into 1981. Domestic private
demand (consumption, stockbui lding and investment) whoLly accounts for the
more pronounced cycl 'feal profi Le. Foreign  demand has stayed on the expected
path, while government corysumption, in volume terms is ~till expected to grow
sl ightly :in 1981. Thus the revised forecasts prepared by the
Commission' s services in February suggest that the upturn in activity may
be delayed until the third quarter of 1981, two quarters later than earlier
expected. GDP growth at an annual  rate  of about 2% is now expected in the
second half of 1981 and into 1982. T~e year on  year  growth of GDP for 1981
for the Community as a whole i~ revised down from ... 0,6% in the Annual Economic
Report to - 0,6%.
Employment could fall by nearly 1%, and by the end of the year the
unemployment rate eould be above 7 1/2% . (1) and still rising.
A significant slowdown in consumer prices can be expected during the
course of 1981, as the effect of more moderate wage settlements in the first
hal f of the  yea"  is reinforced by some rebound of product ivity: in the second
half. Although consumer prices for 1981 as a whole could be up by around
10 1/2% on 1980 (Table 1), the annual rate in the seco.nd half of the year
could, at 8,2%, be 4 1/2 points lower than in the second half of 1980. 
Divergence of infLation rates shouLd also lessen somewhat, with the standard
deviation  consumer prices ~ncreases falling back to 4,
~ communi~Y s balance of payments current accou~t is likely to chan~Je
little during the course of 1981 and for the year as a whole could be slig'htly
worse than the high deficit recorded in 1980. A further worsening of the terms
of tra~e in 1981 will sl ightly more than offset an improvement in volume
movemend.
3.. Pol icy issues
The Council' is required (according to the 1974 Convergence Decis10n)
to deliberate in March as regards possible adjustments to the economic
.....
I..
(1) Seasonally adjusted figure.pol  icy  guidelines adopted in the Annual Report in December.
At the time the Council concluded that the policy mix should give
priority to the reduction in inflation, savings in oi l imports, and the
pursuit of the other necessary structural changes in the Communi ty economy,
and be only moderately supportive in terms of cyclical demand management.
The weaker economic outlook cannot imply an easier way out of the constraints.
While the evolving situation calls for technical adjustments to some financial
policies, the fundamental line of policy - to reduce inflation and push
ahead with structural adaptation"" has to be pur~ued with even greater urgency-
Control of domestic monetary aggregates and exchange rates within
the European Monetary System has on the whole been sat isfactory. However,
monetary polic~ in Europe has been and i~~ sti  confronted with the neeri for a
concerted reaction to the very high al1d volati le interest rates prevai l ;ng in
' .
the United states, and to.the ~pre~iation of the
':'
exchange rates of the dollar and yen-
The appreciation of the Yen appears to be justified in the light
of Japan' s trading performance. With respect to the United States ' moneta ry
pol'icy, Europe is much affected by both inf;erest and exchange rate movements.
If European interest rates now moved further up on average towards United
States levels, it i$ quite likely that as a result there would be no cyclical
recovery in Europe this year. On the other hand, a further substantial
depreciation of European currenci~s against the dollar could risk causi~g
a new acceleration of inflation in the Community, through the increase in
import prices in European currencies. Moreover, erratic swings in either
exchange rates or inter~st rates are costly to the economy through the
uncertainty that they introduce.
In view of its larg!:' current account deficit on the balance of payments,
the Community should be prepared to accept higher dollar exchange rates
than prev~iled in 1980 on average. The inevitability of this deficit in
the short-ruri means that its financ ing should be carefully prepared.
This in itself shouLd pose no insuperable problems; the Community has for
its part in February renewed and expanded its own recycl ing faci l ity. Experience
confirms how quickly conditions may change as between EMS currencies and the
main floating exchange" rates, and Europe should not make fundamental changes 
in its domestic monetary policies ;n response to volatile exchange rate move""
ments. The United StateS authorities for their part could contribute to the'
international interest by managing their budgetary-monetary poi icy mi x
and the techniques of monetary pol i cy wi th a
1.....
view to reducing the level of interest rates consistent with a stable
evolution of money supply.
Within the community, Member States must match the difficulties
of transatlantic monetary conditions with intensified cooperation 
regards interest rate adjustments, intervention policy and official capitsl
movements. In addition to full use of the mechanisms of the European Monetary
System, there would seem now to be opportunities for adjustments of United
Kingdom monetary policy as regards interest rates and criteria of exchange
rate management.
Apart from the increase in unemployment a consequence of the weaker
level of activit)l in ~981 is  some increase in budget deficits over what had
been forecast in the Annual Report. However , the structural weaknesses in
parts of the European econmmy are such that, a full play of the 'automatic
stabili sers' cannot be ri sked in all countries. In part i cular, countries
with the highest deficits (Belgium, Ireland, Italy) should act to prevent
increases. Further increases in these countries ' defi tits cannot provide any
sustainable increase in economi c act ivity; on the contrary, increased defi-
cits ... whether spontaneous or discretionary ... are likely to cause swift and
significant interest rate increases. Among these countries, Italy has made
progress in 1980 in reducing the borrowing of .general government to we L l
under 10% of GDP, and this should be conserved in 1981. In the case  of Ireland
prol~ti on on. reduced' elefi  tit tn're:l~t"~.efr to G~P~_ a~sosi9nHi-cant, part; cularl y
in view" the- increased spending Gn pubUc. investment.. In other countri"l"s, some
increase in budget d~ficits should be permitted to support activity; indeed
the ' automat i c stabH hers ' should be allowed to operate fully in countrie~
with the least high def; cits. However, even in these cases, priority must ,?e
given to restructuring expenditure to improve productive potential.
Extensive  structural problems have to be overcome to achieve higher
trend tates. of growth and employment. Policy must intensify efforts to improve
producHve potential by redirecting budgetary resources from subsidies that
are supporting un~conomic or non-priority activities, into aiding public or
private investment. The investment ratio has decl ined from 23.% of GDP in 
1970 to 21% in 1979 in the Community as a whole. Meanwhi le, over the same
period it seems that;. (subject to difficulties of statistical measurement)
investment ~rants re~ained st~tic at 1% of GDP, whereas subsidies
...
1...(notably operating subsidies,- excluding tax expenditures) rose from 1,8% of
, '
GDP to 2,6%, with particularly la~ge increases recorded in' som~
countrieh" Justifications for higher or more rapid fiscal
. .- , ' . .' .' . .. ,
depreciation allowances exist in the accelerated obsolescence of existing
capital .stock due to the higher energy prices, and in the need to achieve
fundamental improvement in industrial competitivity vis-a-vis third countries.
The Commission for its part is following these principles in areas of
Community responsibilityp having recently proposed a reduction of state aids
to steel!1) an increase i.n producers'financial  co"'responsibil ity for surplus
agr;cul tural production
~2) and a strengthening in Communi ty loan instruments
for financing investment
(~)
Progress is being made in reducing the Community s uc,",c..Jence on
imported oi l.. The share of imported oil in gross inland consumption of
primary  energr fell from 4~% 1979~ to 44% ,in '1980, and is expected fa fall
;ther to 42% in 1981.. ,The volum~ of ' et oi l imports .dropped by nearly 11%
in 1980 and should further fall $% or more in 1981",
However, much more progress must. be achieved before the Community
could consider its macroeconomic policy to be nO longer constra ined by
energy market ~factors. Energy p~oduction and savings must be boosted by every pos-
sibLe meilAs..Obst8cte~, -such ,iI$ d.e.lays in investirag' in nuclear power and coal use, . - H 
" ~.- -
or failure to make timely adjustments to energy , consumption taxes so as to
sust~in the ' price message , wilt ultimately exact an 'extremely high price
in l iv;ng standards. .Several countrjes are relatively well endowed in
~ydrocarbon resources (Netherlands, United Kingdom) or have reasonable
chances of becoming much more self-sufficient (Ireland, Denmark); Fr.ance
is making particularly rapid progress with other energy forms. Belgium, Germany
and Italy'" while making efforts in certain areas of energy production or
saving - need urgently to strengthen major features of their nat ions l energy
programmes, or their implementation.. Examples of below-average taxation
of energ? consumption include heating oi l in general, as between forms of hy~ro-
carbon col1'!;;umption, arid,. as between Member states in 'relation to the Commun;ity
. .
average, heating oil in. Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom, petrol in '
Germany and L~xembourg: and diesel oil in Italy and Luxembourg.
(1) COM (81) ~1 final'
(2) COM (81) 50 final
(3) COM (80) 610 final
1..The further deterioration in the labour market situation should be
appraised as a function of its different forms and causes.
Thet)(petted reduction of  employment in 1981 could be corrected p.ro-
gressively wit~ the recovery in, the second hal f of 1981.  The  speed of this
recovery depends on the response of social partners to the need for higher
investment and structural chang.e. particular consideration should in this
context be given to the need to take full account of the deteriorat ion of
employment prospects and to generate new jobs.. Defensive measures and subsidies
would impede the proces~ of reallocatiqn as much as aggressive wage pol ides.
With little productivity growth and, further losses i.n 1981 on the terms of
trade, th ~ is almost .no scope for significant rea l incol1le :~ain!J.!'._.!he
o"'munJ~Y and even the need to accept a t'eal income loss i n some count r i es.
.. 
In some countr.ies strong efforts are currently being made to moderate the
growth of  ~m1nal incomes, and the- Benelux countries in particular are improving
their competitive positions 8S a result of combining a low inflation rate
with stable exchange rates within the EMS. In other countries it is urgent
that more efforts be made to reduce the trend of growth in nominaL ,incomes,
notably in Ireland and Italy. Moreover, the substantial increase in strucll.,ral
unemployment emphasizes the need for wage contracts to allow for the qui cker
adjusments of incomes between countries, sectors and firms where competitivity
and profits have been reduced.
Part ~of the trend incr~ase in  unemployment reflects the longer perio~s
of search between jobs,. facilitated by unemployment and social security benefits.
However, the weak g~owth performance since 1913 increased the number of unempLoyed.
A~ong the ~nemployed certain groups 'are in a particularly vulnerable position:
young peopl~ without sufficient training, women looking for part-time 
jobs and
older people approaching their pension-
age.  To  aid these groups and to alleviate
unemployment in general it is vital that Member States assure sufficient resources
for expanded vocational training and retraining, undertake suppLementary efforts
to help the record supply of young people into their first employment, improve
programmes of apprenticeships (as offered in Germany) and promote pre-pension
schemes and the. creation of part-time jobs..
An old phenomenon has attracted new interest: the growing size of
unrecorded and un~bserved employment which geems to have been spreading
rapidly in many industrial ;sed countries.
1..The multiple and continued efforts to remedy the unemployment situat10n
in Community countries have s~own some results. Mote has to be done, but
no general and ~uick panacea is available. The responsibi 
ity  for employ'"
ment creation Lies as much with those who decide the conditions 
of employ'"
ment at ' the enterprise level as with governments in their macroeconomic and
structural policies at the national and Community level.
Conclusions
The Europeaft and other non-oil 
producing countries  are  now undergoing
the new readjustment process due to the second oil price shock 
eo whose impact
on growth, prices and the balance of payments is similar to ~that of the
fi rst shock in 1913-14. The difficult task 01 governments, trade unions, 
empl.oy"
lers arid household~ lies in the" need t? avoid the policy errors and
mi staken react ions that fOllowed in 1914 and 1915. The consequences of the
second heavy transfer of resources in favour of OPEC 
have to be accepted.
This implies priorities for reducing the growth of nominal labour costs
and for restructuring the productive potential of our economies through
accelerated investment and energy substitution and savings. The scope for
global policy a:tions in the tommunity is very l ;mited mainly because
the high budgetary deficits after the first oil shock could not be
reduced during the modest recovery period 1976-19, and becaus~ present
inflation rates and inflationary expectations in 
most countries are still
excessive. The limited policy contributions of governments could be widen'd
if progress in countering inflation b,comes more evident and if the
structural policy efforts make rapid progress. Only in this way 
is it possible
for Member States to help each other through having a coherent, collectiv
e pro-
gramme for econom1c recovery and improvement in the 
employment situation.
This programme of pol icy coordination impl ies for the Community:
- maint~ance of the generally convergent monetary and budgetary pol icy
orientations approved in December 1980 and ' progress in strengthening the
European Monetary System;
- stro~ger, cooperat~on betw~en the Community and the united states in monetary
and exchange rate pol icies;
'-_.. ~--'. ----- ~' _
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.. limited scope for dema.nd stimulatory actions through a qual Hied acceptance of
automatic budget stabil hers.. but more support for investment, a quicker re-
structuring and energy substitution pol icy, and improved labour retraining
and mobility schemes.Table 1: Main Econom1 c A9greg
::::
'1'/ N- /:S"I
1979 1980 1981 1979 1980 1981
GDP volume, change.
-0 9 "'0,
"0,
tAL
"'0,
-0,
-0,
"'1,
-2, -2,
"'0,
private. c~~'~u!'lJ?t.ion d'rfla"t(),t, %'c~e
5 11,0 9, 9 5,4 4,
17,7 24,5 21,
10,5 13,5 11,
12,2 18,2 16,
14,9 21,2 18,
6 6,5 6, 5 6,3 6,
8 6,3 6,
12,2 16,1 11
12, 10,
OK,
~&-
: GfU 1)
IAl
Unemployment rate, % of
civil ian labour  force
.5, - 6,
. '
3~4 Jj!t 4,
(2,2) (2,1) (2, 1 6,5 7, 9 8,9 ~0,
Current account of balance of payment:.
% GDP
---
-4, -4, -3,
"0, -1,
"'2, -2, "'2,
+0, -1, -1,
"'10, -8, -11,